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MEXICO’S ENERGY REFORM AND THE 2012 U.S.-MEXICO TRANSBOUNDARY
AGREEMENT. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE AND SAFE
EXPLOITATION OF THE GULF OF MEXICO
Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez1
The purpose of this article is to introduce the topics presented during the
2016 Symposium on Improving Cooperation for a Sustainable Gulf of Mexico
After the 2014 Mexican Energy Reform held in Galveston Texas on February 26,
2016. The Symposium was an effort to move beyond the traditional paradigms of
cooperation by inviting participants from governmental agencies, experts, and
academics from both sides of the border. The Symposium was funded through the
National Sea Grant Law Center’s Sea Grant Law & Policy Journal Symposium
Series and organized by the U.S. and Mexican Law Center of the University of
Houston Law Center, the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies at
Texas A&M University – Corpus Christi, and the National Sea Grant Law Center.
The Symposium reflects how academia and government can work together for the
benefit of our joint resources.
Nature knows no legal boundaries. Resources cannot be stopped by walls
with barbwire; no matter how high some people want to build them. They crossnational territories and expand under their logic. They belong to many nations,
and they are there for the responsible exploitation of their communities. The Gulf
of Mexico (Gulf) and its rich hydrocarbon deposits are no exceptions. The
implication of this is that for the development of this enclosed sea area to be
efficient, effective, and safe it requires not only the cooperation of government
officials but also the inclusion of other actors, such as academic institutions,
industry experts, and communities affected by its development.2 The adoption of
international treaties, such as the 2012 Agreement Between the United States and
Mexico Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of
Mexico (2012 Agreement), that regulates the exploitation of the transboundary
fields located along the maritime boundary, is just one step towards achieving that
goal, but by no means is a closing chapter.3
1

S.J.D. Candidate Harvard Law School, LL.M. Harvard Law School, LL.M. in International Law
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, B.A. in Law and B.A. in International Relations ITAM
University.
2
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3
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The geological and biological characteristics of the Gulf force the two
nations and its communities to look beyond the official borderline, and treat the
Gulf as a unit.4 As the 2010 Macondo and 1979 Ixtoc oil spills have taught us, an
industrial accident along the coast of Louisiana or Campeche affects areas, towns,
business, and ecosystems beyond human created borders.5 Sustainable
development in the Gulf should be an ongoing conversation involving a diversity
of actors and ignoring the existence of artificial legal constructions. The lack of
this dialogue is one of the main challenges. States are constructed under the legal
concept of sovereignty and linked to particular geographical spaces that according
to laws determine the jurisdiction of government actors; yet nature, disasters,
community impacts, and biological risks operate under a different logic that
challenges, and even contradicts, the principles of State sovereignty.6 The
exploitation of the Gulf is so complex that the traditional State-to-State relations
headed by diplomatic envoys are ineffective to deal with such a challenge. Open
channels of communication, flexible day-to-day agreements, the creation of
common standards, along with the consultation and interaction with other actors is
the most efficient way to ensure that the Gulf receives the best treatment for the
benefit of both nations and its communities.7 The Gulf requires horizontal
relationships, not hierarchical communications. A more traditional vertical
approach would be equivalent to trying to contain an oil spill with paper.
International agreements should set up the basis of cooperation, but by no means
establish the limits in such a complex binational relation.8

-Mex., Feb. 20, 2012, T.I.A.S. No. 14-718, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/231802.pdf
4
Sanchez & Mclaughlin, supra note 2, at 691–725.
5
See generally James M. West, Comment, The Ixtoc I Oil Spill Litigation: Jurisdictional Disputes
at the Threshold of Transnational Pollution Responsibility, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 475 (1981)
(discussing the Ixtoc I oil spill); Jacqueline L. Weaver, Offshore Safety in the Wake of the
Macondo Disaster: Business as Usual or Sea Change?, 36 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 147, 153 (2014)
(discussing U.S. changes in offshore drilling in after the oil spill). After the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill, the U.S. government and the offshore hydrocarbon industry made changes to its regulations
and practices. See Caroline Haquet, Macando: The Disaster That Changed the Rules,
TECHNICAL NEWSL. (SCOR Global P&C Paris, France), Apr. 2014, for a summary of these
changes.
6
Sanchez & Mclaughlin, supra note 2, at 691–725.
7
Id. at 789–92.
8
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (United States:
Harvard University Press, New edition ed. 2009). (For a comprehensive study on how
international law compliance on regulatory affairs should be analyzed through the lenses of
ongoing bureaucratic and agency cooperation)
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As readers of this Symposium Issue will discover, the current situation in
the Gulf is one where agencies are working together to coordinate efforts. Mexico
and the United States adopted International Treaties, created binational
commissions, and encouraged intergovernmental dialogues. Agencies have been
able to engage and share experiences.9 For instance, the recently created Mexican
National Agency for Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection of the
Hydrocarbons Sector (ASEA) is cooperating with the U.S. Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) to identify key areas where both agencies
can learn from each other.10 In many ways, the 2013 Mexican energy reform has
integrated world-class safety and environmental management systems (SEMS),
yet the challenge remains in their enforcement and monitoring. ASEA is tasked to
supervise and implement the safety and environmental standards of all
hydrocarbon-related activities in Mexico: from the deep-water fields in the Gulf
all the way to the gas pumped in retail stations. Just on the Mexican coast, 250
facilities are operating.11 In addition to the SEMS, ASEA has the task of issuing
technical regulations, restrictive rules, and performance-based regulations. All of
these tasks are aimed at having the industry operate with safe and environmentally
responsible standards in Mexico.
Moreover, its primary approach is corrective enforcement before imposing
fines, and this requires an adequate number of supervisors in the different chains
of production. Yet, ASEA is a new agency with limited resources and personnel
(only 280 employees), and has one of the broadest mandates compared to its
international counterparts.12 On the other hand, after the Macondo disaster, BSEE
has developed substantial expertise on how to work with few resources and still
be able to supervise and monitor compliance effectively in the Gulf.13 There is no
reason why the hard lessons learned by BSEE cannot be transferable to the newly
created ASEA. In the end, they are both dealing with the same operators in similar
geological spaces. Notwithstanding the agencies' efforts to cooperate, there is a
consensus that many issues are still pending resolution, such as establishing
standard criteria for supervision of the fields, and the disparities of regulatory
frameworks applicable to areas on the border, close to the border, and beyond the
9

See the transcript from comments from Alejandro Carabias, Deputy Director for Normativity and
Regulation, Mexico´s National Agency for Industry Safety and Environmental Protection of the
Hydrocarbons Sector (ASEA); and from Allyson Anderson Book, Associate Director fro Strategic
Engagements (BSEE).
10
Id.
11
See Carabias comments.
12
Id.
13
See Weaver, supra note 3.
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border. The application of different standards based solely on the oil field’s
location along the official borderline not only generates uncertainty from the
industries’ point of view, but also leaves the rigs under different levels of
protection and scrutiny regardless of the fact that they are in the same geological
and biological ecosystem. As stated by one of the commentators during the
Symposium from the regulator’s perspective, “it will be easier to draft legislation
that covers the whole Gulf of Mexico that is in harmony.”14 Among regulators,
there seems to be a consensus that the long-term solution is to formalize an
agreement of cooperation between the agencies, BSEE and ASEA, that would
make it easier for officers in both organizations to come up with common
standards and regulations. Today, the only formal cooperation mechanisms are the
diplomatic channels set up by the 2012 Agreement.
Another important set of questions raised during the Symposium was
related to the ability of agencies to manage and adapt to organizational changes.15
Each time there is a legislative development, creating new standards or
bureaucracies (something we know has been happening on both sides of the
border due to political changes or to concrete disasters), officials face the
challenge of adapting.16 Their structures, cultures, and organizational routines are
often entrenched in the day-to-day work of the agency and are difficult to change
in the face of new challenges.17 As the presentation of some of the experts in the
Symposium reminded us, preventing accidents and harm to people and the
environment often depends on the skills, experience, and capabilities of the
people on the ground, rather than on regulations and standards. Surely, clear and
well-defined norms help to enhance the procedures of those who need to prevent
disasters from happening, but they are insufficient on their own.18 Along with new
regulations, new organizational cultures, structures, and practices are also needed.
These changes become even more challenging when there is a disparate set of
agencies working together to regulate one industry, and it becomes a monumental
challenge when it has to be done in a binational way.19

14

See Alejandro Carbias comments.
See Jorge Piñon comments.
16
For example, BSEE was created after the Macondo disaster.
17
See comments from Jorge Piñon, Director of the Latin American and Caribbean Energy
program, Jackson School of Geosciences, the University of Texas at Austin. For a review of how
bureaucratic practices can be on the way for international law compliance see generally CHAYES &
CHAYES, supra note 8.
18
See comments from Jorge Piñon.
19
Sanchez & Mclaughlin, supra note 2, at 726–44.
15
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The area of emergency response is only one example of this. U.S. federal
agencies, such as the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and
BSEE, and Mexico’s ASEA, National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH),
Ministry of Energy (SENER) and Navy have to cooperate with each other in
terms of monitoring licensing compliance, responding to concrete emergencies,
and taking actions to prevent further damages.20 In total, the general operation of
the deep-water fields in the Gulf depends, at different levels and stages, on the
appropriate supervision of nine governmental agencies from both countries. But if
we think about the region in broader terms, regulating oil and gas development
also depends on the help of local authorities, primarily municipal and state
governments, and the affected coastal communities.21 The MEXUS Plan, adopted
in 1980, is the most important binational agreement that deals with transboundary
oil spills, but it only contemplates coordination once a disaster has occurred and
does not consider the complex diversity of actors involved in the protection of the
Gulf.22 For example, the authorities involved on the Mexican side do not include
the newly created agencies ASEA and the CNH, and these are the two most
prominent organizations in charge of supervising the execution of the contracts
signed with the government for the exploitation of deep-water fields.23
A third important issue presented by the experts during the Symposium
involves the existing facilities and capacities of the state-owned energy company
of Mexico (PEMEX). For more than seventy years, this company was the only
one allowed to exploit the hydrocarbons located on the Mexican side of the
Gulf.24 This industry giant operated as a company, regulator, government entity,
and, in many ways, representative of the workers union. Functions,
responsibilities, and tasks that in other parts of the world are well determined and
separated among different entities were mixed, confused, and placed under one
single monopoly. Today, the 2013 Energy reforms in Mexico have taken away the
exclusive control of PEMEX and opened up the use of its existing facilities for the
benefit of incoming private companies. Several questions remain regarding how
the new regulations will allow the use of these facilities for the new fields in the
20

See Mclaughlin in this Issue.
See Alyson Winnicki comments.
22
The Joint Contingency Plan Between the United Mexican States and the United States of
America Regarding Pollution of the Maritime Environment by Discharge of Hydrocarbons or
Other Hazardous Substances, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 25 2000, 32 U.S.T. 5899 [hereinafter MEXUS
Plan].
23
Id. Annex VI
24
For a review of the Mexican energy reform and how it interacts with the 2012 Agreement see
Sanchez & Mclaughlin, supra note 2, at 747–72.
21
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borderline area. For example, the Mexican agency in charge of regulating these
permits, the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE), has the challenge to make
sure that the access is open and non-discriminatory, and that there is an adequate
tariff regulation. Moreover, according to the Mexican energy reforms, PEMEX
has to have at least a 20% participation in any project involving transboundary
fields.25 For most of its existence, PEMEX only dealt with private companies
using service contracts; today it has to deal with them as partners in the
development of high-risk areas. The key question for the sustainable development
of the Gulf is how this is achieved without losing sight that resource exploitation
must be efficient for the benefit of both nations, not only due to a constitutional
mandate in Mexico, but also the terms of the 2012 Agreement.26 In other words, is
PEMEX’s existing infrastructure and corporate governance structure ready for the
challenge?
Finally, there is also a consensus on the value of social indicators and
consultation with communities for the decision making of regulatory agencies.27
Taking these community stakeholder’s views into consideration can help us to
evaluate potential and actual effects of policies, programs, projects, and
management actions. In the area of public health emergencies, for example, to
ensure an adequate preparedness, coordination, and response, the responsibilities
of different actors must be clearly broken-down.28 Local communities, volunteers,
and organizations are critical in addressing health preparedness challenges.
Without a clear division of roles, actions easily duplicate and contradictory tasks
are taken. In the same vein, Mexico faces difficulties regarding the process of
consultation with indigenous communities affected by the development of the
industry.29 What are their components and what is expected from the regulators
and the companies according to national and international standards?
Finding answers to all of these challenges will not be an easy task for
Mexico and the United States, particularly now that the industry is already
operating in the region. On the U.S. side of the Gulf, operations have already
begun in fields that could contain transboundary resources.30 On the Mexican
25

Id. at 759.; Ley de Hidrocarburos [Law of Oil], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación,
[DO], 11 agosto de 2014, section II, art. 16 [hereinafter National Hydrocarbons Law], art. 17.
26
Id. at 759–61.; 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 2, art. 12(1)–(2).
27
See Victoria C. Ramenzoni and Patricia Arceo in this Issue.
28
See Alyson Winnicki´s comments.
29
See Raul Mejia in this Issue.
30
Dale Quinn, Mexico Opens Up Its Deepwater Oil Fields, THE FINANCIALIST (Mar. 14, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/mexico-opens-up-its-deepwater-oil-fields-2014-3.
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side, last December, the Ministry of Energy announced the fourth phase of the
Energy Reforms. This new development consists of the tendering process of ten
deep and ultra-deep water blocks in the Gulf.31 Four of them are located in the
Perdido Foldbelt, a geological area shared by both countries.32 Our plan as
organizing academic institutions is to serve as a platform for collaboration
between society and governmental actors to address these issues, and those that
might emerge in the future. The publication of the papers and presentations in this
Symposium Issue is just one mechanism to achieve that. We welcome advice
from the agencies and operators on other ways in which we can help the complex
relationship between Mexico and the United States to achieve safe and efficient
methods for the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources from the Gulf. Perhaps in
the near future, we can also invite Cuban colleagues to participate in this ongoing
dialogue.33 Given the recent opening of relations between the United States and
Cuba, many of the issues addressed here will also be relevant to potential
transboundary activities with that important neighbor in the Gulf.

31
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32
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Descubrimiento en Aguas mexicanas en la Zona Transfronteriza del Golfo de México [Trion -1
Well: First Discovery in Mexican Waters in the Border Zone of the Gulf of Mexico] 2 (2012),
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33
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